Positive Outcome
Luke Ritter of Ridge Global considers the effectiveness of cargo scanning options in contraband detection
Contraband detection has developed into a complex game of ‘cat and mouse’ that plays out throughout global commerce. Criminals continue to perfect the process of hiding illicit material, in plain sight. Disguising contraband as ‘normal’ cargo can be extremely profitable for individuals willing to operate on the dark side of transportation. Security professionals, on the other hand, are continually seeking technology solutions that increase the probability of successfully intercepting these illicit shipments. In many cases, the probability of successfully intercepting contraband is directly tied to the operational effectiveness of cargo scanning technology. Employing technology that optimises the probability of detection is a critical component of an overall cargo security programme.
We’ve all heard the phrase, ‘seeing is believing’. In the world of cargo scanning, it turns out that this may, or may not, actually be true. The other common phrase that comes to mind is ‘I can’t believe my eyes’. Hasn’t everyone seen an image of something that appeared to be one thing, but turned out to be another? Image interpretation can be more of an art than a science, where cargo scanning is concerned.
Many of the currently fielded cargo scanning solutions are classified as imaging solutions. An imaging solution uses technology to produce an image of the contents of a container. Twodimensional images are generated by these systems that provide an imagery analyst with a representation of whatever material has been placed into the scanner. Unfortunately, these imaging systems have some significant limitations with regard to enhancing the probability of intercepting contraband.
Contraband can be hidden, or masked, among normal commodities. Not all objects loaded in a container can be easily imaged. Water and frozen peas, for example, are notorious for hiding or masking other less dense objects that may be loaded in the same container. Similarly, two-dimensional images can also be misleading. An image that looks like a missile, for example, can turn out to simply be pieces of scrap metal arranged in a way that appears ‘missile-like’ in an image. And using imagery alone to try to intercept explosives, disguised as cans of SPAM, can be nearly impossible. Cargo scanners that intercept contraband by detecting it, rather than by imaging it, provide security professionals with an enhanced probability of success.
Consider this operational scenario… as a security professional, would you rather be told that contraband had been detected in a container, or that an image indicated that a container might contain contraband? These two security notifications are quite different. In the first case, an anomaly had been detected, and a positive determination was made that contraband was present. In the second case, analysis of an image caused suspicion about a container, but there was no definitive finding of contraband. A follow-on step, of some kind, is always required to investigate a suspect image. Arguably, detecting contraband is more valuable than imaging contraband, because it provides actionable information. Detection is believing.
The cargo security challenge presented by false positives, and false negatives, continues to frustrate professionals in transportation. A scanner that uses automated contraband detection is much more likely to eliminate false positives and negatives, than a scanner that requires a person to interpret an image. Images contain shadows and blind spots, and high density cargo, stacked in front of lower density material, can produce ambiguous imagery. Automated detectors, on the other hand, only generate an alarm when a contraband element is determined to be present. Interpretation is not required, in this case. The anomaly is either present, or it is not, and that presence is automatically determined by the scanner.
A good example of a cargo scanning solution that relies on detection, versus imaging, is the scanner that combines two technologies to locate contraband: muon tomography and electron stopping. These technologies have been combined, along with some proprietary algorithms developed at one of the US National Laboratories, to produce a promising new contraband scanner. This passive machine identifies, verifies and locates contraband in cargo containers, in 3-D, even when the contraband material is mixed in with heavily cluttered ‘normal’ cargo.
A cluttered load of this type is notoriously difficult to interrogate with imaging systems. As muons and electrons interact with cargo, they produce output data that is associated with the unique molecular composition of each individual commodity present. The scanner uses that data to detect contraband by sorting through, and reconciling, a cargo container’s contents. This is done at the molecular level, without the use of imagery, or any requirement for image analysis.
Profitable enterprise
Clearly, smuggling contraband can be a profitable enterprise, or criminals would not take the risk associated with being apprehended by law enforcement. Importers, freight forwarders and Customs brokers have been caught intentionally mis-declaring cargo for the purposes of avoiding duties, and circumventing quotas and tariffs. Hiding illicit material in a shipment of legitimate goods can significantly increase a criminal’s return on investment. The European Union (EU) has estimated that cigarette smuggling deprives Member States of somewhere between €10 billion-€17 billion ($13 billion-$22 billion) per year in uncollected duties.
The National Cargo Bureau, Inc. inspects approximately 15,000 containers a year. The bureau has stated publically that mis-declared freight is still a ‘huge problem’. In 2006, the bureau coordinated a year-long audit for the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Some 25,000 containers were opened at random throughout the world, and 32% of the containers opened contained misdeclared contents. The US Coast Guard also participated in this study, and opened an additional 16,000 containers at random – more than 6,000 of these (37.5%) contained mis-declared freight.
Interestingly, ‘the catch me if you can’ game can work both ways. There is a significant incentive for Customs agencies worldwide to enhance the probability of intercepting mis-declared freight. Every shipment like this that is intercepted by law enforcement officials can provide an opportunity to gather duties that would have otherwise gone uncollected. The revenues that are generated by these interceptions have the potential to put billions of dollars into national treasuries.
In most cases, investments in cargo scanning equipment that are effective in detecting contraband come bundled with accelerated amortisation schedules. These scanners can pay for themselves very quickly once they are deployed. In short, an effective contraband detector is not just a security tool, but also has the potential to be a revenue generator, when properly employed.
Automation is an important feature that should be considered when evaluating contraband detection technologies. If the top-level objective in cargo security is to mitigate threats, while also facilitating the free flow of commerce, then it is essential to employ scanning policies, procedures and technologies that serve both objectives.
This ‘mitigate and facilitate’ mission is best served when a large volume of cargo can be scanned efficiently, effectively and reliably. Automation contributes in all three areas. Imaging systems are almost entirely dependent on post-processing image interpretation performed by highly trained experts. In most cases, this requirement negatively affects the volume of cargo that can be scanned, the time required to scan that cargo, and the reliability of the scanning results. Automated contraband detection, however, does not have these limitations.
Ideally, a contraband detector should provide security professionals with an automated output focused on a ‘green light/red light’ type of decision point, for every container scanned. This allows the intercept facility to be focused on the ‘red light’, or suspect cargo scans, only, and allows for a concept of operations where ‘green light’, or cleared, cargo can pass with a high degree of assurance that there is no contraband present. Similarly, in an optimised security solution, a very high percentage of red light scans should result in contraband intercepts. By automating the detection process, cargo security professionals can use scanning technology as a force multiplier that reduces manpower requirements, minimises false positive/negative scans, and facilitates the flow of commerce.